




Repeatable Oblivious Shuffling of Large Outsourced Data Blocks

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Outsourcing in the Cloud

2019 Public cloud services market >\$206.2 B



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Technology reporter

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
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UPDATED ON: APRIL 4, 2019 / 11:35 AM / CBS NEWS

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Secure Computation Outsourcing



Encryption is Insufficient

Input: [a], [b]

Task:

if $a > b$:

branch 1 ←————— a=2, b=1

else:

branch 2 ←————— a=1, b=2


Oblivious algorithm: make the control flow be independent of the input data

- oblivious transfer/ sorting/ **shuffling**, etc.

Problem

Oblivious Shuffling (OS)


A shuffling of n encrypted data blocks $[B] = ([B_1], \dots, [B_n])$ according to a permutation π is oblivious if the server is unable to infer π .




Untrackable

which is which


Application



private data access
(hide access pattern)




private data integration/sharing
(hide data source)



coin mixing in cryptocurrency
(hide owner anonymity)

State of the Art

All existing OS methods rely on the movement of outsourced data to the client.




heavy communication for shuffling
large-sized blocks

Repeatable Oblivious Shuffle

Definition

An oblivious shuffle of $[B] = ([B_1], \dots, [B_n])$ is repeatable if it is performed by the server without increasing encryption layers.



Preliminaries

→ Homomorphic matrix multiplication

$$[M_1] \odot M_2 = [M_1 \cdot M_2]$$

→ Matrix based data shuffling

$$B \cdot \pi = (B_1, B_2) \cdot \begin{pmatrix} 0 & 1 \\ 1 & 0 \end{pmatrix} \Rightarrow (B_2, B_1)$$

Main Idea

Key Requirements

- repeatability: server side shuffling, no increase in encryption layers
- obliviousness: shuffling must be oblivious



split the information of π into
plaintext H and some ciphertext $[H_A]$

Formalization

$$[B^{(\eta)}] \leftarrow ROS(\pi^{(\eta)}, [B^{(\eta-1)}])$$


data after shuffling

$$[B^{(\eta)}] = [B \cdot \pi^{\eta-1} \cdot \pi^{(\eta)}]$$

permutation
matrix

data before shuffling


$$[B^{(\eta-1)}] = [B \cdot \pi^{\eta-1}]$$



Construction



1. pick $\pi^{(\eta)}$
2. compute $H^{(\eta)}$ and $[H_A^{(\eta)}]$



3. compute the shuffling result by


$$\left[\begin{array}{c} \text{data blocks } B \\ \times \\ \text{coefficient matrix } \pi^{\eta-1} \cdot \pi^{(\eta)} \end{array} \right] = \left[\begin{array}{c} \text{data blocks } B \\ \times \\ \text{coefficient matrix } \left[\begin{array}{|c|c|} \hline H_A^{(\eta)} & \pi^{\eta-1} \\ \hline \end{array} \right] \end{array} \right] \odot \begin{array}{c} \text{coefficient matrix } H^{(\eta)} \end{array}$$

Legend: data blocks coefficient matrix


Analysis

 known  unknown

→ Correctness


$$\left[\begin{array}{c} \pi^{\eta-1} \cdot \pi^{(\eta)} \end{array} \right] = \left[\begin{array}{cc} H_A^{(\eta)} & \pi^{\eta-1} \end{array} \right] \odot \begin{array}{c} H^{(\eta)} \end{array}$$


→ Obliviousness


$$\left[\begin{array}{c} \pi^{\eta-1} \cdot \pi^{(\eta)} \end{array} \right] = \left[\begin{array}{cc} H_A^{(\eta)} & \pi^{\eta-1} \end{array} \right] \odot \begin{array}{c} H^{(\eta)} \end{array}$$

Experimental Settings


	Algorithm	Description
Our approach	ROS	Server-side shuffling without increasing encryption layer
Baseline	ClientShuffle	Client-side shuffling (download data for every shuffling)
	LayeredShuffle ($l = 2$)	Service-side shuffling with increasing encryption layers (download data for peeling off extra layers after every l shuffles)
	LayeredShuffle ($l = 10$)	

Effect of Block Size m



Shuffle cost w.r.t. block size m (MB) ($n = 4$, ClientShuffle has no server computation and thus not reported)

Effect of Block Number n



Shuffle cost w.r.t. block number n ($m=10$ MB, ClientShuffle has no server computation and not reported)

Q and A?

